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ABSTRACT. Regularly invoked by the Supreme Court in diverse contexts, the maxim nemo
iudex in sua causa - no man should be judge in his own case - is widely thought to capture a
bedrock principle of natural justice and constitutionalism. I will argue that the nemo iudex
principle is a misleading half-truth. Sometimes rulemakers in public law do and should design
institutions to respect the value of impartiality that underlies the nemo iudex principle. In other
cases, they do not and should not. In many settings, public law makes officials or institutions the
judges of their own prerogatives, power, or legal authority. Officials or institutions may
determine their own membership, award their own compensation, rule on the limits of their
own jurisdiction, or adjudicate and punish violations of rules they themselves have created.
I will attempt to identify the general conditions under which rule designers sensibly depart
from, override, or qualify the nemo iudex principle. In some cases, there is no impartial official or
institution in the picture, so that wherever decisionmaking authority is lodged, someone or other
will have to be the judge in his own case. In other cases, even where it would be feasible to
respect the principle, the costs of doing so will exceed the benefits. In general, this will be so
when and because impartiality trades off against one or several competing considerations: the
benefits of expertise, the value of institutional autonomy and independence, or the motivation
and activity level of officials and institutions.
The upshot is that it is never sufficient to argue that a proposed institution, or a proposed
interpretation of ambiguous constitutional rules or practices, would violate the nemo iudex
principle. One must go on to ask whether the conflict is avoidable or unavoidable, and, if it is
avoidable, whether it would be good or bad overall to avoid it.
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INTRODUCTION
The maxim nemo iudex in sua causa'- no man should be judge in his own
case -is widely thought to capture a bedrock principle of natural justice and
constitutionalism. The U.S. Supreme Court calls it "a mainstay of our system
of government"' and regularly invokes it in diverse contexts -most famously
as a principle of natural law in Calder v. Bull4 and, implicitly, to justify
constitutional judicial review in Marbury v. Madison.s The maxim has venerable
roots in the common law, the leading precedent being Bonham's Case.6 And it
1. The principle is classically articulated in the Justinian Codex, which includes a provision
entitled "Ne quis in sua causa judicet vel sibi jus dicat" ("No one shall be judge in his own
cause"). FRED H. BLUME, ANNOTATED JUSTINIAN CODE 3.5.1 (Timothy Kearley ed., 2d ed.
2oo8), http://uwacadweb.uwyo.edu/blume&Justinian/Book%2o3PDF/Book%2O 3-5.pdf. As
Kearley notes, the older Codex Theodosianus seemingly derives this principle from the rule
that no man should be allowed to testify for himself. Id.; see 1 THE THEODOSIAN CODE AND
NOVELS AND THE SIRMONDIAN CONSTITUTIONS 2.2.1, at 39-40 (Clyde Farr ed. & trans.,
1952). For the history of the principle in medieval law, see D.E.C. Yale, ludex in Propria
Causa: An Historical Excursus, 33 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 8o (1974).
2. Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 428 (1995).
3. See, e.g., Nev. Comm'n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2348 (2011) (noting the
principle that legislators should recuse themselves from voting on questions in which they
have a personal interest because "the fundamental principles of the social compact [forbid]
... any man to be a judge in his own case" (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF
PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 31 (1801)));
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 886 (2009) ("[N]o man is allowed to be a
judge in his own cause .... ); Pounders v. Watson, 521 U.S. 982, 992 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1952), which refers
to "established judicial practice, which makes it unfitting for a judge who is personally
involved to sit in his own case"); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986)
(finding that a state supreme court justice's participation in a case violated the defendant's
due process rights because the justice had created a precedent that would affect the
outcome of a similar suit that he himself had filed); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)
(holding that an individual's constitutional rights were violated when his case was heard
before a judge who had a pecuniary interest in finding that individual guilty); Spencer
v. Lapsley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 264, 266 (1857) ("The act of Congress [at issue] proceeds
upon an acknowledgment of the maxim, 'that a man should not be a judge in his own
cause[]' .... ).
4. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (identifying "a law that makes a man a Judge in his own
cause" as an example of an act "contrary to the great first principles of the social compact"
that "cannot be considered a rightfil exercise of legislative authority").
5. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ("To what purpose are powers limited, and to what
purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed
by those intended to be restrained?").
6. Dr. Bonham's Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P.) 652; 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 118a (Coke, C.J.)
(holding that a college of physicians given statutory powers to punish unlicensed medical
practice could not act as "judges, ministers, and parties" simultaneously). Justices
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rests upon a principle of impartial decisionmaking that has undoubted appeal,
both on deontological and consequentialist grounds." As we will see, the appeal
of impartiality is so strong that legal and political actors and commentators
have extended the scope of nemo iudex well beyond judging in the strict sense,
to cover decisions by many types of officials in many institutions.
Despite all this, I will argue that the nemo iudex principle is an exaggerated
and misleading half-truth. Sometimes rulemakers in public law do and should
design institutions with a view to the nemo iudex principle. In other cases,
however, they do not and should not. In many settings, public law makes
officials or institutions the judges of their own prerogatives, power, or legal
authority. Officials or institutions may determine their own membership,
award their own compensation, rule on the limits of their own jurisdiction, or
adjudicate and punish violations of rules they themselves have created. Some
examples:
. In many jurisdictions, legislators determine the boundaries of the
districts from which the legislators themselves are elected, or
otherwise structure the system by which they are elected.
* In many jurisdictions, legislatures have broad authority to
determine the qualifications of their own members and to expel
members.9
sometimes cite the decision for some version of the nemo iudex maxim. See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc.
v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 329 n.* (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (citing Bonham's Case for the "ancient maxim 'aliquis non debet esse Judex in
propria causa'-no man ought to be a judge of his own cause"); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 197 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Bonham's Case
for the "first principle: '[N]o man shall be a judge in his own cause"').
7. For both accuracy arguments and fairness arguments in support of the principle, see, for
example, THoMAs HOBBEs, LEVIATHAN 102 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Macmillan 1946)
(1651):
[S]eeing every man is presumed to do all things in order to his own benefit,
no man is a fit arbitrator in his own cause; and if he were never so fit; yet equity
allowing to each party equal benefit, if one be admitted to be judge, the other is to
be admitted also.
For the same reason no man in any cause ought to be received as arbitrator,
to whom greater profit, or honour, or pleasure apparently ariseth out of the
victory of one party, than of the other: for he hath taken, though an unavoidable
bribe, yet a bribe; and no man can be obliged to trust him.
8. See, e.g., Justin Levitt & Michael P. McDonald, Taking the "Re" Out of Redistricting: State
Constitutional Provisions on Redistricting Timing, 95 GEo. L.J. 1247, 1255 n.38 (2007) (referring
to a number of states, including Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin, and California, whose
constitutions vest the duty of apportionment in those states' legislatures).
3 97
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. In many jurisdictions, legislators set their own salaries and
compensation.'0
. The President arguably has the power to pardon himself and
clearly has the power to pardon his friends, family, and advisers."
. The Vice President arguably has the power to preside at his own
impeachment trial and clearly has the power to preside at the
impeachment trial of friends and political allies. "
* A ubiquitous feature of the administrative state is that agencies
combine the functions of rulemaking, prosecution, and
adjudication."
. In America, federal judges and many state judges rule on the
constitutionality of legislative acts setting judicial salaries.14
* In many jurisdictions, judges have the final say over the limits of
judges' power, prerogatives, and jurisdiction."s
. A federal judge may rule on her own immunity from suit, 6 rule on
motions asking her to recuse herself for bias, and decide whether to
hold litigants in contempt for violations of her own commands. At
the level of the Supreme Court, each Justice rules on motions
asking that Justice to recuse himself, and the rulings are
unreviewable."
9. See H.W. DODDS, PROCEDURE IN STATE LEGISLATURES 3 (1918) ("The right to judge of the
elections and qualifications of its own members is expressly conferred upon each house by
the constitutions of forty-six states.").
io. See, e.g., Ronald E. Weber, Presidential Address, The Quality of State Legislative
Representation: A Critical Assessment, 61 J. POL. 609, 610 (1999) ("[M]ost state legislatures
set their own salaries and benefits . . . .").
ii. See infra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 97.
13. See infra Section II.E.
14. See infra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest
State Courts, 61 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs., Summer 1998, at 79, 97 (noting that the "highest
state courts in several states have a constitutional power to enact procedural rules for use in
inferior courts," that some state courts have held that "procedural matters are beyond the
kin of legislatures and are [those courts' own] exclusive responsibility," and that "[i]n some
states, the power to enforce standards of judicial conduct is vested within the judicial
branch").
16. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (explaining that judges enjoy absolute
immunity from suit for actions taken in the exercise of their judicial functions).
17. See infra Subsection III.B.i.
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The list is heterogeneous on several dimensions, which I will explore at
length below, but that very heterogeneity illustrates that the nemo iudex
principle is qualified in many settings and on many different grounds.
In this Essay, I will offer two claims, one destructive and one constructive.
The destructive claim is that the nemo iudex principle cannot even be
understood as a presumption to which public law sometimes makes
exceptions; rather, it amounts to little more than a banal counsel that
impartiality is sometimes an important value in institutional design.
Impartiality constantly trades off against and competes with other values. Far
from being a mainstay of our system of government, the most that can be said
is that the nemo iudex principle sometimes holds and sometimes does not.
As for the constructive claim, I will attempt to identify the main grounds
on which, and the main conditions under which, rule designers depart from,
override, or qualify the nemo iudex principle. As we will see, in some cases there
is no impartial official or institution in the picture, so that wherever
decisionmaking authority is lodged, someone or other will have to be the judge
in his own case. In other situations, even where it would be feasible to respect
the nemo iudex principle, the costs of doing so will exceed the benefits. In
general, this will be the case when and because impartiality trades off against
one of several competing considerations: the benefits of expertise, the value of
institutional autonomy and independence, or the motivation and activity level
of officials or institutions.
The upshot is that it is never sufficient to argue that a proposed institution,
or a proposed interpretation of ambiguous constitutional rules or practices,
would violate the nemo iudex principle or would "put the fox in charge of the
henhouse." One must go on to ask whether the conflict is avoidable or
unavoidable - and, if it is avoidable, whether it would be good or bad overall to
avoid it. As we shall see, in a range of cases, violations of nemo iudex are either
unavoidable or affirmatively desirable, on balance.
The largest aim is to illustrate a general point about how constitutional and
institutional designers manage political risks. Among the various risks that rule
designers in public law must consider is the risk of self-dealing or self-serving
bias on the part of decisionmaking officials or institutions. Yet there are many
countervailing risks to consider, which implies that rule designers will have to
trade off those risks against one another: rather than selecting maximal
precautions against official or institutional self-dealing, they will have to select
optimal precautions. In the most difficult cases, the nemo iudex principle
appears on both sides of the balance, so that preventing self-dealing by one
i8. See Adrian Vermeule, Precautionary Principles in Constitutional Law, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 181,
217 (2012).
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decisionmaker will increase the risks of self-dealing by another decisionmaker.
In such cases, the principle is in conflict with itself, and an appeal to it will
necessarily be question begging. A well-rounded analysis will consider risks of
bias that may arise on all sides of the relevant institutional questions.
Part I examines several versions of the nemo iudex principle and addresses
its scope and weight. Part II examines cases in which a violation of nemo iudex
is unavoidable wherever decisionmaking authority is lodged, so that the
principle is in conflict with itself. Part III examines cases in which the value of
impartial decisionmaking embodied in nemo iudex trades off against other
values: the direct costs of appointing an impartial decisionmaker (Section
III.A), expertise and information (Section III.B), institutional autonomy and
independence (Section III.C), or institutional "energy" and activity levels
(Section III.D). Part IV offers some rules of thumb for identifying conditions
under which rule designers should or should not entrust officials or
institutions with the authority to act as judges in their own cause. A brief
Conclusion follows.
1. NEMO IUDEX AND CLOSE RELATIVES
Although I will speak throughout of the "nemo iudex principle," this is
actually a simplification for ease of exposition. In fact there are multiple Latin
tags whose content is more or less equivalent. These include nemo debet esse
iudex in propria causa (no one ought to be judge in his own cause) and nemo
potest esse simul actor et iudex (no one can be both litigant and judge at the same
time);'9 the latter version clarifies that the principle forbids simultaneous
judging and litigating in the same case.
A. Core and Periphety
If there is an inviolable core to these maxims -and I will later suggest that
there is not -the core is that no person should be permitted to judge his own
cause by sitting as a judge over litigation to which he is a named party. There
are, however, a variety of ways of extending nemo iudex outward from this
situation. For one thing, the principle is often said to apply when a judge sits to
decide a case in which he has a more or less direct financial interest, even if the
judge himself is not also one of the nominal litigants.20 A slight further
ig. For discussion of these versions of the maxim, see GEORGE FREDERICK WHARTON, LEGAL
MAXIMS WITH OBSERVATIONS AND CASES: IN Two PARTS 101-02 (London, Law Times
Office, 2d ed. 1892).
20. See, e.g., Tumeyv. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
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extension involves cases in which the judge's relatives or friends have a
financial interest. Still further out are scenarios in which the judge's interest in
the case might expand the power or perquisites of the judicial branch as a
whole, in which the judge holds only a fractional share," or of the government
as a whole, in which the judge's fractional share is smaller still. Finally, the
most aggressive extensions posit that not merely an interest in the litigation,
but an appearance of an interest, such that the judge's impartiality "might
reasonably be questioned,"' suffices to trigger the principle.
Moreover, although the principle and its relatives speak of judging, they
have long since been extended to embrace other types of decisionmaking that
are implicitly analogized to judging. When James Madison invoked the
principle in Federalist No. lo to describe a majority legislative faction's voting
for legal rules that would favor the interests of that faction," the usage was at
least doubly, and perhaps triply, metaphorical. Not only did the issue involve
legislative rather than judicial voting, but the interests at issue were indirect
rather than direct, and the cause that any given legislator was "judging" might
be collective rather than individual, depending upon whether Madison saw the
faction's interests as collective or distributed among its individual members.'
In addition, where executive officials apply settled law to facts -a class of
decisions that is hard to distinguish from judging, except by reference to the
institutional attributes of the decisionmaker -the Court has also invoked nemo
iudex. In Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno,2 s the question was whether a court
could review a certification by the Attorney General that a federal employee
sued for a tort was acting within the scope of federal employment. In the
circumstances of the case, the certification would have had the effect of
immunizing the employee from litigation, and the Court saw this as
implicating nemo iudex, on the ground that the Attorney General would be
21. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
22. 28 U.S.C. 5 455(a) (2006) ("Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States
shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned."); see Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994) ("Quite simply and quite
universally, recusal [is] required whenever 'impartiality might reasonably be questioned."'
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1974))).
23. THE FEDERALIST No. 1o, at 47 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) ("No man is
allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his
judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.").
24. Id. ("With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and
parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation but so
many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but
concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of
legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine?").
25. 515 U.S. 417 (1995).
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acting as judge in her own cause. Not only was this an extension of the maxim
to executive decisions rather than judicial ones, but the Court's description of
the Attorney General's decision as judging in her own cause was highly
strained. At most, as the dissent pointed out, the Attorney General would be
favoring the interests of other federal employees.
B. Reformulations?
One line of response to the many examples in which the constitutional
system violates nemo iudex as broadly understood by the Court and by
commentators is simply to reformulate the principle. Reformulations might
address either (or both) of two margins: the weight of the principle or its
scope. The former strategy would say that the principle does apply broadly,
just with reduced force. The latter would attempt to preserve the strong force
of the principle within some narrower domain.
Reformulation by reducing the weight of the principle is fully compatible
with my account. Later in this Essay, I will attempt to show that the principle
identifies impartiality as an institutional good under certain conditions, that
impartiality is merely one good among the many goods that institutional
designers must take into account, and that in a wide range of cases rulemakers
will have to trade off these goods against one another. Thus, I have no quarrel
in principle with this approach. To be clear, however, this would indeed be a
reformulation. The traditional conception holds that nemo iudex is an
"inflexible"" principle that is fundamental to the legal system, rather than a
mere reminder that impartial decisionmaking is sometimes a good thing, in the
right circumstances.
A different strategy would constrict the scope of the principle in order to
preserve its force within the new, narrower scope. The reformulation would
say that nemo iudex as such applies only to cases in which judges are also named
litigants and presumably also to cases in which judges have a direct pecuniary
interest in the outcome. As a result, other institutional structures that create
risks of partial or biased decisionmaking might then be labeled (mere)
"conflicts of interest" and deemed subject to institutional tradeoffs.
For several reasons, however, this approach fares poorly. For one thing, the
historical genesis of the principle is not at all consistent with it. Consider
Bonham's Case, frequently cited for the sacrosanct status of nemo iudex, and
according to some, the foundation for something like constitutional judicial
26. Id. at 448-49 (Souter, J., dissenting).
27. WHARTON, supra note 19, at 119 ("The rule [ofnemo iudex] is inflexible, and as well the king
as the conunoner is subjected to it. . . .").
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review.8 The facts of the case involved an institutional conflict of interest in
which a chartered college of physicians claimed legal authority to fine or
imprison physicians practicing without a license. In his invocation of nemo
iudex, Chief Justice Coke objected to this arrangement because it made the
censors of the college into "judges, ministers, and parties" simultaneously,2 9
but we will see that similar institutional conflicts of interest on the part of
public and quasi-public agencies are a routine feature of the modern American
administrative state. If the reformulated principle condemns this sort of
arrangement, it is too broad; if it does not, then it does not even encompass
Bonham's Case- the leading nemo iudex precedent at common law.
Furthermore, current constitutional law simply cannot be squared with this
reformulation. On the one hand, the Court invokes nemo iudex in situations
that lie outside the scope of the narrowed reformulation, as in the "attenuated"
circumstances of Gutierrez de Martinez.3" On the other hand, constitutional law
licenses violations of nemo iudex even in situations that should lie squarely
within the core. When federal judges sit to decide cases concerning judicial
salaries-cases brought by plaintiffs-judges to determine the salaries of the
whole group of sitting judges, including the judges who will decide the case
itself- there is not an attenuated conflict of interest, but rather a direct one. If
the plaintiff-judges represent a class that includes the judge-judges, then the
latter are litigants in name and the violation of the nemo iudex maxim is quite
literal. One cannot salvage nemo iudex by constricting its scope, trying to hive
off the institutional violations while preserving a core domain for the principle,
if at least some of the violations themselves lie within the core. Whatever the
normative justifications for the reformulation - and I will argue that the
normative arguments are complex and highly contingent - it fails the test of fit
with current law.
All told, the nemo iudex principle is invoked promiscuously, in a range of
different settings with different decisionmakers and different types of
28. There is a running debate among legal historians on the question of whether Bonham's Case
counts as an example of judicial review of parliamentary legislation. For recent analyses, see
PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAw AND JUDIcIAL DuTY 622-30 (20o8); and R.H. Helmholz, Bonham's
Case, Judicial Review, and the Law ofNature, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYsIs 325 (2009).
29. Dr. Bonham's Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P.) 652; 8 Co. Rep. 107a, n18a. As to the
college's power to levy fines, it appears that the college would receive a part of the fines and
in this sense had a pecuniary interest. But that was a corporate pecuniary interest, not a
direct individual one; presumably the fines would go to the college's treasury, not into the
pockets of the members who judged the case. (When federal judges levy fines, of course, the
money likewise goes into the treasury of the organization that pays their salaries.) And in
any event, the point would not apply to the college's power to imprison, which for Chief
Justice Coke and the plaintiff was at least as objectionable as the power to fine.
30. 515 U.S. at 449 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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decisions. My suggestion, however, is that the principle is not consistently
honored in any of these settings, whether inside or outside the situation of self-
judging that lies at the putative core of nemo iudex. It is useful here to compare
nemo iudex with any one of the many settled principles that indisputably
pervade our morality and law -say, the principle that it is a legal and moral
wrong to kill another person intentionally." That principle is something like a
presumption subject to exceptions, such as self-defense and defense of third
parties. But those exceptions are well-defined and are plausibly deemed
exceptional relative to the large domain within which the principle
unquestionably applies. By contrast, the list I gave earlier suggests that central
structural features of the constitutional system are inconsistent with nemo
iudex, not only in its broadest formulations but even at its narrower putative
core. And as I will suggest later, constitutional rules and structures that are
plausibly based on nemo iudex are for the most part afterthoughts - second-
decimal adjustments or minor side constraints.
The upshot is that there are two ways of characterizing the actual scope and
weight of nemo iudex in our constitutional and legal order. One might say that
nemo iudex is a sham principle because it is more exception than rule, like a
house that is made mostly of doors. Alternatively, one might say that nemo
iudex is a genuine principle, just one that is both weak within the domain in
which it applies, and that is also riddled with a large set of ill-defined
exceptions -something like the moral principle against lying, which is
frequently defeasible and actually defeated, and which is likewise riddled with a
large set of ill-defined exceptions. Which of these two characterizations is best
will turn, in part, upon what counts as a "principle," a jurisprudential issue that
I will leave to philosophers of law. For the purposes of constitutional theory,
however, I need not choose between the two characterizations because both are
inconsistent with the traditional legal claim that nemo iudex is a mainstay or
axiom of the American constitutional order. Whether described as a sham
principle or as a weak and porous principle, nemo iudex amounts to far less than
the received wisdom suggests.
Overall, in light of the numerous tradeoffs that the following Parts will
detail, nemo iudex is best understood merely as one competing consideration
among many. Nemo iudex points to the value of impartial decisionmaking, but
there are many institutional goods besides impartiality, and in many settings
rule designers decide that those other goods are more important under the
circumstances, or that none of the feasible institutional arrangements can
produce impartiality. Or so I will proceed to argue.
31. Thanks to John Goldberg for suggesting this comparison.
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II. UNAVOIDABLE VIOLATIONS
One major class of rejoinders to the nemo iudex principle arises when the
alternative decisionmaker is said to be equally partial or biased. In the strongest
versions of this argument, the claim is that for structural reasons there can be
no impartial decisionmaker in the relevant domain, so that any allocation of
decisionmaking authority must necessarily violate nemo iudex. I will offer a
series of examples.
A. Federal Judicial Review ofState Court Decisions
Joseph Story provides an early example of this response in his role as a
Supreme Court Justice. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee," the main issue was
whether the Court could review and, if necessary, overturn state court
decisions on matters of federal law. An underlying concern for state officials
and Anti-Federalists was that federal courts would be biased in favor of
extending the scope of federal laws and federal constitutional power, including
the power of the federal judges themselves: federal judges deciding federal
questions, they worried, would be acting as the arbiters of their own power. In
response to this concern, Justice Story argued, among other things, that there
was no impartial decisionmaker anywhere in the picture:
From the very nature of things, the absolute right of decision, in the last
resort, must rest somewhere -wherever it may be vested it is susceptible of
abuse. In all questions of jurisdiction the inferior, or appellate court,
must pronounce the final judgment; and common sense, as well as legal
reasoning, has conferred it upon the latter."
Although Justice Story was too much of a political veteran to be explicit
here, given the sensitivity of state-federal relations in his day, his point was
that if the federal courts are not the final judges of their own jurisdiction, the
state courts will be the final judges of their own jurisdiction. As the latter
regime would also violate nemo iudex, the choice between the two regimes must
be made on other grounds.
395
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B. Judicial Review in General
Later commentators have transposed Justice Story's argument into an
objection against judicial review of individual rights claims and indeed
generalized from it an objection to judicial review generally. These
commentators are responding to a long and disreputable tradition in which
nemo iudex is invoked, in the most facile manner imaginable, to justify judicial
review. After all, the reasoning runs, if there is no independent body charged
with deciding whether legislatures have stayed within the constitutional
boundaries of their powers, then the only judge of that question is the
legislature itself, and this would violate nemo iudex or "appoint the fox as
guardian of the henhouse."4 As against this sort of claim, Jeremy Waldron
argues quite rightly that no institutional arrangement can avoid the nemo iudex
problem:
Those who invoke the maxim nemo iudex in sua causa in this context say
that it requires that a final decision about rights should not be left in
the hands of the people. Rather, it should be passed on to an
independent and impartial institution such as a court.
It is hard to see the force of this argument. Almost any conceivable
decision rule will eventually involve someone deciding in his own case.
Unless we envisage a literally endless chain of appeals, there will always
be some person or institution whose decision is final. And of that
person or institution, we can always say that because it has the last
word, its members are ipso facto ruling on the acceptability of their
own view."
The issue is somewhat more complicated than Waldron allows, but his
basic point is correct: judicial review allows the Court to rule on the limits of its
own power, and thus puts the fox in charge of the henhouse just as much as
does a system with no judicial review at all. The complication is that there is a
third way between legislative and judicial supremacy in constitutional matters:
a departmentalist system in which both Congress and the Court can decide
constitutional questions as they see fit, with neither having the authority to
bind the judgment of the other. But in that sort of system, both Congress and
the Court still do rule-so far as their rulings go-on the limits of their own
34. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal Courts, 18o1-
1835,49 U. CHI. L. REv. 646, 657 (1982).
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power. The departmentalist system, in other words, puts several foxes in
charge of several henhouses. That may or may not be a better system, all things
considered, than either the system of legislative supremacy or the system of
judicial supremacy, depending on whether the foxes somehow check one
another. But it is not a system that avoids violating the nemo iudex principle; on
the contrary, it multiplies the violations.
C. Legislative Districting
The unavoidability arguments offered by Justice Story and Waldron rebut
nemo iudex on conceptual grounds: in the relevant settings, there is no possible
allocation of decisionmaking authority that avoids making some official or
institution judge in its own cause. In other settings, however, the
unavoidability argument is not conceptual, but institutional. Although it may
be possible, in the abstract, to allocate decisionmaking authority to an impartial
institution, the incentives of the relevant political actors ensure either that no
such institution will actually come into being or that impartiality will prove
unsustainable in the long run.
An example involves legislative districting. The current system -in which
legislators often determine the shape and composition of their own districts -
represents a large-scale violation of nemo iudex. Accordingly, a popular position
holds that districting should be entrusted to independent and impartial expert
commissions or bodies that will supposedly enjoy the freedom to draw districts
based on objective, welfare-maximizing criteria. Against this argument,
proponents of legislative districting offer many rebuttals, one of which is that
independent and impartial districting is infeasible because it is not incentive
compatible. As the districting commission must itself be created by the political
system it is set up to regulate, the political actors who establish it will
predictably rig its powers, procedures, and composition to achieve the same
ends that they pursue in a system of legislative districting. On this view,
it is almost impossible to design institutions to be authentically
nonpartisan and politically disinterested . . . . Whoever draws the lines
must get authority from somewhere-the person will either be
appointed or elected. Elected officials . . . are almost certainly conflicted.
And appointed officials will be beholden to those appointing them or at
least selected because their intentions are well-known. 6
36. Nathaniel Persily, Reply, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial
Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARv. L. REv. 649, 674 (2002).
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Alternatively, political actors may simply undo the independence of the
districting commission if it produces politically unacceptable results. In
Arizona in 2011, for example, the Republican governor and state senate fired
the chair of an independent districting commission, with the governor
claiming that the chair displayed a bias in favor of Democrats. This was a rare
case of an observable confrontation, but the threat of such action will implicitly
constrain "independent" commissions by virtue of the law of anticipated
reactions. Sometimes the underlying incentive-compatibility problem can be
overcome by law or norms, but it is an open question how often, and for how
long, true independence can be sustained.
D. "Independent" Agencies and Courts
Similar political mechanisms underpin two other examples, both of which
are sufficiently familiar in the public law literature that I will mention them
only briefly. The first involves the "independent" agencies, such as the
National Labor Relations Board, whose members can be discharged only for
cause, and who typically serve staggered terms. Although such structures
theoretically insulate the independent agencies from presidential control,
evidence suggests that by the end of their first term, presidents typically
control policymaking at "independent" agencies, in part by appointing
members whose political preferences are predictable. 9
Second, and more famously, a large body of political science evidence
shows that the Supreme Court itself follows the election returns, albeit with a
lag, largely because appointments to the Court are made by the same political
system that the Constitution is supposed to regulate.4 o Although genuinely
countermajoritarian rulings are possible in the short run,' in the long run,
37. See Marc Lacey, Arizona Governor and Senate Oust Redistricting Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2,
20n, http://www.nytimes.con/2on/n/o2/us/chairwoman-of-arizona-redistricting-commission
-ousted.html.
38. For an excellent overview, see Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The
Theory and Operation ofIndependent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111 (2000).
39. Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits
ofInstitutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REv. 459, 469-71, 477-87 (2008).
40. The classic account is Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as
a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957). For citations to the enormous follow-on
literature, see, for example, Micheal W. Giles, Bethany Blackstone & Richard L. Vining, Jr.,
The Supreme Court in American Democracy: Unraveling the Linkages Between Public Opinion
and Judicial Decision Making, 70 J. POL. 293 (2008).




CONTRA NEMO IUDEX IN SUA CAUSA
constitutional law is highly elastic, and changes as public opinion affects the
selection of Justices by the President and the Senate. At least in this long-run
sense, a genuinely independent and politically impartial Court is an unlikely
arrangement given the incentives in place.
E. Combination ofFunctions
But perhaps the largest compromise of the nemo iudex principle to be found
in public law is the combination of functions in administrative agencies-a
routine feature of the massive administrative state. Although the variety of
administrative institutions and procedures is bewildering, many agencies in
some way or another combine the powers of rulemaking, investigation,
prosecution, and adjudication. Such agencies, in other words, may decide cases
that they themselves have investigated and decided to bring, under rules that
they themselves have made. From a traditional perspective, this combination of
functions makes the agencies both parties and judges-a violation of the
supposed core of the nemo iudex principle. Libertarian and originalist critics of
the administrative state thus routinely complain that agencies act as judges in
their own cause.42
In the face of similar objections, James Landis's argument for the
combination of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions in administrative
agencies relied in part on the claim that separating functions by lodging
adjudicative power in courts alone would merely risk a different form of bias."
On this view, while the combination of administrative functions risks biased
decisionmaking by agencies that decide the cases they themselves have
initiated, judicial determination of agency prosecutions risks running aground
on the ideological biases of the judges, whose opinions will on average have
been formed in an earlier era. As Landis put it in his discussion of the Federal
Trade Commission's creation,
Judicial interpretation of the statutory standards laid down by the
Congress plainly gave the judges power to mold the statute to their
own conceptions; and that molding had too frequently set at naught
the public and political effort which had so hopefully expended itself in
the passage of the statute. Judicial interpretation suffered not only from
42. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1231,
1248-49 (1994) (originalist critique); Ilya Shapiro & Caitlyn W. McCarthy, Are Federal
Agencies the Sole Judges of Their Own Authority?, REG., Summer 2011, at 4 (libertarian
critique).
43. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 91-113 (1938).
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inexpertness but more from the slowness of that process to attune itself
to the demands of the day."
Although the political appointment mechanism ensures that in the long run
independent judges will follow the election returns, it does not follow that they
are legally impartial at any given time. Rather, the risk is that, given the lag
time inherent in the appointment mechanism, the judges will impose the views
of "the day before yesterday"4s on the administrative agencies. Landis argues in
effect that the insulation of the judiciary from current politics itself creates
room for the operation of ideological biases, as opposed to impartial legality;
hence there is no impartial institution in the picture, and the combination of
functions in agencies cannot be rejected simply on the ground that it creates a
risk of biased decisionmaking. Rather, one must compare the biases of all
relevant institutional alternatives.
Ill. COSTS AND TRADEOFFS
I now turn to cases in which the benefits of an impartial decisionmaker
trade off against, and may be outweighed by, competing considerations: the
direct costs of appointing an impartial decisionmaker, expertise, institutional
independence or autonomy, and institutional energy. These tradeoffs are
hardly amenable to precise analysis. In such cases, rule designers engage in an
impressionistic balancing, with ill-specified weights, under conditions of grave
uncertainty. But the rule designers cannot simply throw up their hands in the
face of conceptual and empirical difficulties. A rule must be chosen, and as we
will see, rule designers will sometimes have substantial reasons to conclude
that nemo iudex should give way.
A. Direct Costs
I begin with the nearly trivial point that the nemo iudex principle's
application is routinely constrained by cost. Where two parties are in conflict,
appointing a third, impartial arbiter can be an expensive exercise. If the state
44. Id. at 96.
45. Id. at 97 (quoting ALBERT VENN DICEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW & PUBLIC
OPINION IN ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 369 (2d ed. 1914)).
46. See NEIL K. KOMEsAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POUCY 141 (1994) (explaining that judges are insulated from a
large amount of information about the needs and desires of the public, and that the "distant
judge" or the "more distanced administrative agency" may be less biased).
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subsidizes the appointment, as when the state maintains a system of courts to
which all parties may have nearly free access, those costs are subsidized and
spread across all taxpayers. In some settings, however, the out-of-pocket costs
of obtaining an impartial judgment may be decisive.
An analogy is in order. In local tennis tournaments, a common
arrangement is that referees are present only for the final, decisive rounds. In
earlier rounds, the players themselves judge whether balls hit toward their side
are in or out, in effect becoming judges in their own cause. The principal
reason for this regime is that it is simply too expensive to staff local
tournaments with a large complement of referees for all matches in the early
rounds.
In theory, this structure also illustrates another idea: offsetting violations of
nemo iudex can "mimic ... impartiality."" In this example, because each player
judges the shots hit to her own side, each is judge in her own cause, and thus
both players are in a kind of repeat-play relationship for the duration of the
match. The players thus have a tit-for-tat incentive to make fair calls. This
mechanism is highly fragile, however. Self-serving bias is pervasive even if the
players are seeking to cooperate, and crucial calls late in the match will no
longer take place under an indefinite horizon of future cooperation. The result
is defection and blatantly self-serving calls that increase in number as the
match progresses.
Of course, the constitutional system can draw upon a cadre of state-
subsidized impartial decisionmakers -judges -so the cost constraint is
somewhat relaxed. However, the constraint still bites. Statutes require federal
judges to recuse themselves from a case when their impartiality "might
reasonably be questioned,"4 and if recusal occurs, a second judge is called in to
preside. However, the first judge rules on the disqualification motion, and thus
assesses her own bias, subject only to deferential review.49 One of the main
justifications for this practice is the simple "[in] efficiency"so or costliness of
calling in a second judge to decide a preliminary motion of this sort; the costs
include delay, which harms both the litigants and the legal system. More
generally, one of the reasons that officials and citizens cannot instantly obtain
an impartial judicial opinion on the legal validity of their actions is that
resource constraints create a queue for the use of the courts. The delay that is
47. Jon Elster, Mimicking Impartiality, in JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS FOR BRIAN BARRY 112
(Keith Dowding, Robert E. Goodin & Carole Pateman eds., 2004).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (20o6).
49. See Susan B. Hoekema, Comment, Questioning the Impartiality ofJudges: Disqualifying Federal
District Court Judges Under 28 U.S.C. 5455(a), 6o TEMP. L.Q. 697, 698 (1987).
50. Id. at 713.
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part and parcel of litigation arises, in part, simply because it is not feasible to
create a cadre of judges of the size that would be necessary to process all cases
swiftly.
B. Impartiality and Expertise
In the theory of institutional design, a standard tradeoff involves a conflict
between the values of impartiality and expertise. In some settings, it is possible
to decrease the bias of decisionmakers solely by reducing the information they
hold or their incentives to invest in acquiring new information. For example,
the rules for selecting petit juries exclude jurors with antecedent knowledge of
the case in order to minimize bias, in contrast to the medieval English rules,
under which jurors were selected from the locality. It has been argued that the
impartiality produced by adversarial rules of litigation, which prohibit ex parte
presentations and restrict judges' ability to gather relevant information outside
of court, have the effect of reducing judges' information.' "The tradeoff is
between a political process that integrates far more information but with a
more significant risk of bias and an adjudicative process that suppresses
information but decreases distortions in its presentation.""
Conversely, selecting the most informed decisionmakers tends to produce
an increased risk of bias. In the administrative state, agencies are often staffed
by actors with close ties to regulated groups. Although such actors are more
likely to have an agenda, where the regulated domain is highly complex, actors
of that sort will typically have indispensable specialized knowledge." Here and
elsewhere, actors with a stake in the decision are precisely the actors with the
greatest incentive to acquire relevant information, which yields a chronic
tradeoff between well-informed decisionmaking and impartial decisionmaking.
1. Judicial Bias and Disqualification
Where the nemo iudex principle is qualified or violated, the actual or stated
justification is sometimes that enforcing the principle would produce
unacceptable costs by eliminating expertise or weeding out the best-informed
decisionmakers. In the judicial setting, judges rule on motions for
51. See KOMESAR, supra note 46, at 141.
52. Id.
53. See Saul Levmore, Efficiency and Conspiracy: Conflicts of Interest, Anti-Nepotism Rules, and
Separation Strategies, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2099, 2103 (1998); Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, The
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disqualification, in effect ruling on their own bias rather than calling in a
second judge. Although relevant statutes allow the inferior judges' rulings on
their own bias to be reviewed by higher courts, the review is deferential (and
decisions about recusal by Supreme Court Justices themselves are not
reviewable at all).
One of the standard justifications for this set of rules is that the second
judge lacks the first's information about the background circumstances of the
case. The Court has held that the rules governing judicial bias and recusal
contain an implied exception: bias in the pejorative sense arises only if the
judge's preconceptions derive from an "extrajudicial source."' Preconceptions
that the judge has formed during preliminary stages of the proceeding, or
related earlier proceedings, do not generally count as "bias" of the sort that the
law will find invidious. The justification for the exception is based in part on
the value of the information held by the presiding judge, which would be lost if
previous determinations in the case could create grounds for disqualification.
As the Court put it in Liteky v. United States,
The judge who presides at a trial may, upon completion of the
evidence, be exceedingly ill disposed towards the defendant .... But
the judge is not thereby recusable for bias or prejudice, since his
knowledge and the opinion it produced were properly and necessarily
acquired in the course of the proceedings, and are indeed sometimes (as in
a bench trial) necessary to completion of the judge's task. As Judge Jerome
Frank pithily put it: "Impartiality is not gullibility. Disinterestedness does not
mean child-like innocence."
By contrast, the rules for selecting petit jurors strictly maximize impartiality
and thus in effect aspire to child-like innocence.
2. Legislative Districting (Redux)
A similar tradeoff between impartiality and information can also be
observed in legislative settings. As discussed earlier, in many jurisdictions
legislatures determine the composition of the districts from which the
legislators themselves are selected-an institutional conflict of interest that may
produce incumbent-favoring gerrymanders, partisan gerrymanders, or
54. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550 (1994).
5s. Id. at 550-51 (emphasis added) (quoting In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 65o, 654 (2d Cir.
1943)).
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collusive, bipartisan gerrymanders. Many commentators thus call for
independent and nonpartisan districting by expert commissions or courts.s6
One of the main defenses of the current regime, however, is that legislative
redistricting is desirable because legislators possess crucial information about
relevant constituencies and their distinctive problems -information that is
perhaps held in a largely tacit or experiential form, and thus cannot be easily
transmitted to nonlegislative redistricting bodies.' On this view, the basic
tradeoff is that on the one hand, "incumbents' knowledge of their districts
gives them almost unparalleled expertise as to the effect of a given set of lines
and insiders are more likely to be sensitive to community concerns," while on
the other hand, "bipartisan or partisan gerrymanders sometimes intentionally
disrupt or divide communities and often ignore policy goals en route to
creating safe seats."s" However this tradeoff cashes out, and whatever the
optimal design of redistricting institutions in a given political environment, it
is fatally simplistic to condemn legislative redistricting on the grounds that it
puts the fox in charge of the henhouse.s9
3. Administrative Combination ofFunctions (Redux)
As discussed earlier, originalist and libertarian critics of the administrative
state object to the administrative combination of functions on nemo iudex
grounds and call for strict separation of functions within or across agencies.
Both Congress and the Supreme Court have, however, consistently rejected
such claims. The Administrative Procedure Act requires that separate personnel
perform the functions of investigation and prosecution, on the one hand, and
adjudication, on the other, at lower levels of the administrative agency.o
Despite this, the statute exempts the agency or its members-that is, the top-
level agency heads or commissioners -from this separation requirement.
Many agency heads thus hear and decide cases that they themselves have
directed subordinates to investigate and prosecute, and in which the agency
56. See, e.g., J. Gerald Hebert & Marina K. Jenkins, The Need for State Redistricting Reform To
Rein in Partisan Gerrymandering, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 543, 558 (2011) ("State-level
redistricting reform, particularly in the form of independent redistricting commissions, is
absolutely necessary in order to fulfill the promise of government for the people, by the
people.").
57. Persily, supra note 36, at 671-72.
s8. Id. at 678-79.
so. Id.
6o. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (d)(2) (2006).
61. Id. § 554(d)(2)(C).
404
122.3 84 2012
CONTRA NEMO IUDEX IN SUA CAUSA
itself is one of the named parties. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld
this arrangement against due process challenges complaining that the
combination of prosecutorial and adjudicative fuinctions compromises the
impartiality of agencies." And the main ground for the Court's decisions has
been that the combination of functions is necessary to secure expert
administrative decisionmaking in a complex society.
In Withrow v. Larkin," for example, the Court framed the issue as a
tradeoff among competing political risks. The case involved a due process
challenge to a state administrative board charged with policing medical
misconduct (akin to Bonham's Case). The board had the power to investigate
licensed physicians, cause charges to be brought against them, and then
adjudicate the charges after a hearing; the principal sanction the board could
impose was suspension of the physician's license. The Court rejected "[t]he
contention that the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions
necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative
adjudication."61 The tradeoff was that a constitutional rule barring
combination of administrative functions "would bring down too many
procedures designed, and working well, for a governmental structure of great
and growing complexity."6 Here the Court echoed one of the original New
Deal defenses of the combination of functions, which held that the
development of administrative expertise would be hamstrung if agencies could
not shape their own regulatory agendas by bringing cases that the agency itself
would adjudicate. 6 Given basic tradeoffs between impartiality and informed
expertise in the administrative state, consistent implementation of nemo iudex
would promote impartiality at too great a price.7
C. Impartiality and Independence
In other settings, rule designers qualify or violate the nemo iudex principle
in order to ensure the independence or autonomy of institutions. In these
settings, a given institution is made judge in its own cause because allocating
decisionmaking authority to a different institution creates a risk that the second
62. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955); FTC v.
Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
63. 421 U.S. 35.
64. Id. at 47.
65. Id. at 49-50 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971)).
66. LANDIS, supra note 43, at 91-113.
67. Id. at ioi (arguing that rulemakers must "take into consideration the assets as well as the
liabilities" of the combination of functions in administrative agencies).
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institution will leverage its authority to control the first in ways that will be
undesirable from a larger systemic perspective. Where this is so, giving the first
institution the authority to act as judge in its own cause may create a risk of
self-dealing, but the rule designer may believe this to be an acceptable risk-an
unavoidable precondition for, or byproduct of, a system of institutional
independence that is desirable overall.
1. Legislative Salaries
The network of constitutional rules governing legislative salaries illustrates
these tradeoffs. The enacted Constitution authorized the Congress, acting by
law, to pay its members a salary out of the national treasury.68 This outcome
emerged only after extensive debates among the delegates at the Philadelphia
Convention. The discussion centered on three related questions. First, should
the legislators be paid at all? Second, if they were to be paid, should they be
paid by the states from which they were selected - as was the practice under the
Articles of Confederation - or instead by legislative appropriation from the
national treasury? Third, should the amount of compensation be fixed by the
Convention or left to the discretion of future legislators themselves?
For present purposes, the second and third questions are the most critical.
Madison argued at the Convention that legislators should not be allowed to
compensate themselves because of the risk of self-dealing: "Mr. Madison
thought the members of the [legislature] too much interested to ascertain their
own compensation. It [would] be indecent to put their hands into the public
purse for the sake of their own pockets.",6 On the other hand, Madison, like
many other delegates, also argued that "it would be improper to leave the
members of the [national] legislature to be provided for by the State
[legislatures]: because it would create an improper dependence."o As
Alexander Hamilton put it in one of his rare interventions, "Those who pay are
the masters of those who are paid."" Hamilton "pressed the distinction
between State [Governments and] the people. The former [would] be the
68. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6. Over two hundred years later, the Twenty-Seventh Amendment
created a requirement that salary increases could take effect only after an intervening
election. See id. amend. XXVII. Given the high rate of reelection for federal legislators, it is
an open question how much restraint the Amendment imposes. And agenda-setting power
still lies with the legislators themselves, rather than other institutions; the legislators may
thus time salary increases strategically, waiting until other political circumstances align to
make reelection a safe bet.
69. 1 MAx FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 373-74 (1911).
70. Id. at 215-16.
-P. Id. at 373.
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rivals of the [General Government]. The State legislatures ought not therefore
to be the pay masters of the latter."72
In the face of this dilemma, Madison argued for a constitutionally fixed
standard of compensation, perhaps indexed to the price of wheat or some other
commodity to allow increase over time. Most of the other delegates, however,
thought that a fixed compensation was undesirable or unworkable, either
because its visibility would instigate opposition to the proposed Constitution"
or because any fixed standard would be insufficiently sensitive to changing
circumstances.' As between the solutions that allowed for variable
compensation -payment by the states or self-payment by federal legislators -
the Convention opted for the latter solution, with several members arguing
that the risk of self-dealing was low, perhaps because the great visibility of
legislative salaries would trigger popular oversight. Indeed, Roger Sherman
"'was not afraid that the Legislature would make their own wages too high; but
too low."" Throughout the debate, delegates took account of Elbridge Gerry's
observation that "there are difficulties on both sides"76 and offered judgments
about how best to balance the competing risks-a far cry from simple
invocation of nemo iudex.
A different solution would be to let a different branch of the national
government, such as the President, set the salaries for federal legislators.
Toward the close of the debate, the Convention agreed to a motion to provide
that payment from the national treasury should be "ascertained by law" - that
is, by statute as opposed to by an internal legislative rule." Although the shape
of the executive branch was still fluid and contested when this amendment was
carried, the eventual consequence was that the President would have the power
to veto a bill setting legislative salaries. Here too, however, legislators would
still play a role in setting their own compensation. No one raised the possibility
72. Id. at 374.
73. Nathaniel Ghorum argued that the fixed compensation could not be made "as liberal as it
ought to be without exciting an enmity [against] the whole plan." Id. at 372. Benjamin
Franklin objected on the ground that the Convention itself could be accused of self-dealing:
"He wished the Convention to stand fair with the people. There were in it a number of
young men who would probably be of the Senate. If lucrative appointments should be
recommended we might be chargeable with having carved out places for ourselves." Id. at
427.
74. James Wilson "was [against] fixing the compensation, as circumstances would change and
call for a change of the amount." Id. at 373.
7s. Id. at 291.
76. Id.
77. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6 (providing that federal legislative salaries shall be "ascertained by
Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States").
407
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
of a pure regime in which, for example, the President acting alone would set
the legislature's salary. Despite its apparent compatibility with nemo iudex, the
obvious concern about such a regime would be that the President could
leverage his power over compensation to compromise legislative autonomy. In
light of the notorious practices by which British monarchs of the eighteenth
century had corrupted members of Parliament, the Convention adopted several
provisions intended to check executive vote buying, 8 and presidential control
over legislators' compensation would have been inconsistent with those efforts.
2. Judicial Salaries and the Rule ofNecessity
The value of institutional independence is also said to underpin the
Supreme Court's invocation of the "rule of necessity" in cases where federal
judges bring lawsuits complaining that their salaries have been
unconstitutionally diminished. Article III's Compensation Clause provides that
the judges "shall, at stated times, receive for their Services a Compensation
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office."" In some
cases, judges bring suits that will determine the compensation of all federal
judges as such, so that every federal judge has a direct financial interest in the
outcome.SO The implication is that any judge who decides the case is sitting in
her own cause, a core violation of nemo iudex. The Court, however, allows such
suits to proceed under the common law rule of necessity, which holds that if all
judges would be disqualified, none is."'
It is hardly obvious that the rule of necessity is really necessary. If the case
cannot proceed without a nemo iudex violation, perhaps it should not proceed at
all. The Court sometimes cites an "absolute duty of judges to hear and decide
cases within their jurisdiction,"" a phantom duty that is routinely violated by
federal judges under myriad prudential doctrines that license abstention from
78. The Ineligibility and Emoluments Clauses state:
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be
appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall
have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during
such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a
Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.
Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
79. Id. art. III, § 1.
go. See, e.g., United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557 (2001); United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200
(1980).
81. For a discussion of the rule, see Charles Gardner Geyh, Roscoe Pound and the Future of the
Good Government Movement, 48 S. TEX. L. REv. 871, 885 (2007).
82. Will, 449 U.S. at 215.
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the exercise of jurisdiction." Alternatively, the Court sometimes points to the
need for judge-litigants to obtain a forum for litigating their individual
constitutional rights,5 4 but this rationale is no more successful. If the rule of
necessity even applies, then what is at stake is really an attempt by judge-
litigants to obtain a forum that is necessarily biased in their favor, and it is
unclear why it is better that they should enjoy such a forum than that their
constitutional claims should be remitted to whatever protection the political
process will afford.
If there is a plausible rationale for the rule of necessity, it is that suits for
compensation by judge-litigants produce a positive externality by helping to
protect the independence of the judges from political retaliation -one of the
main aims of the Article III rules. As the Court puts it, "[T] he Compensation
Clause is designed to benefit, not the judges as individuals, but the public
interest in a competent and independent judiciary."" The judges say, in other
words, that the risk of biased adjudication in their own favor is an unavoidable
byproduct of a regime that minimizes the risks of political interference with
judicial independence. On this happy view, the judges' interests align with
those of the overall system; what is good for judicial salaries is good for the
nation." Whatever the ultimate merits of that claim, the tradeoff between
impartiality and independence is clear."
83. RcHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1049-82 (6th ed. 2009).
84. See Will, 449 U.S. at 217.
8s. Id. (citing Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 253 (1920)).
86. Expanding the lens beyond the U.S. federal court system to include state courts and the
courts of other nations, some judiciaries have asserted powers to determine their own
budgets or their own membership. Courts in several U.S. states have ordered legislatures to
appropriate judicially specified amounts to fund the court system, asserting that the power
to do so is inherent in or necessary for judicial independence. The leading case is
Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1971); for further discussion and
citations, see Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial Power in the State (and Federal) Courts, 2000 SuP.
CT. REV. 357, 382-87. In India, the Supreme Court has held that judicial independence
requires the government to appoint the most senior judge of the court to the position of
chief justice, despite the absence of any textual provision to that effect in the constitution.
See In re Special Reference No. i of 1998, (1998) 7 S.C.C. 739, 760 (India).
87. Similarly, it has been argued that tighter congressional regulation of recusal practice by
Supreme Court Justices -who under current norms have unreviewable discretion to rule on
their own disqualification-would violate the separation of powers, in part because it would
threaten to undermine the "integrity and professionalism" of the Court. Louis J. Virelli III,
The (Un)constitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal Standards, 201 Wis. L. REv 1181, 1229.
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3. Qualifications and Expulsion ofLegislators
A final example involves the authority of each chamber of Congress, under
Article I, to "judge" the "Elections, Returns and Qualifications" of its members
and to expel members." Although there is a norm that legislators do not vote
on their own personal qualifications or expulsion, this regime nonetheless
violates the extended sense of nemo iudex that Madison invoked in Federalist
No. lo. In the aggregate, each chamber as a group determines its own
composition. The standard defense of this arrangement, offered by Justice
Story in his Commentaries on the Constitution, holds that "[t]he only possible
question on such a subject is, as to the body, in which such a power shall be
lodged. If lodged in any other, than the legislative body itself, its
independence, its purity, and even its existence and action may be destroyed, or
put into imminent danger."" Justice Story's argument refers in explicit terms
to the political risk that committing the power to judge qualifications elsewhere
would compromise the independence of the chamber. Implicitly, Justice Story
trades this off against the risk of institutional self-dealing that is created by
cameral self-judging of qualifications and finds the former risk more serious.
As we will see in Part IV, however, the Philadelphia Convention also adopted
substitute protections against the latter risk.
D. Impartiality and Institutional "Energy"
At least since Niccol6 Machiavelli's analysis of glory seeking as a spur to
executive action,90 constitutional actors and analysts have discussed the effects
of constitutional rules on institutional "energy."9 Although the nature of
institutional energy is obscure, a straightforward interpretation is that
institutions and officials that at least partly control their own agendas may
choose varying levels of activity or outputs, and that constitutional rules may
shape and constrain such choices. The more institutional activity is desirable,
the more costly are rules that give institutional actors an incentive to do
nothing rather than something.
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. I.
89. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 831, at 295
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833).
go. Adrian Vermeule, The Glorious Commander-in-Chief, in THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY 157 (Jeffrey K. Tulis & Stephen Macedo eds., 2010).
gi. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, supra note 23, at 391 (Alexander Hamilton). For later discussion,
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For present purposes, the important point is that in certain environments,
impartiality may trade off against institutional activity levels. Where
constitutional rules assign decisionmaking authority to self-interested or biased
actors, the benefit may be that those actors will have greater motivation or
incentive to act, for the very reason that they have a stake in doing so. A fallacy
lurking behind the stock arguments for the nemo iudex principle is that biased
action (somehow defined) is necessarily socially undesirable action. On the
contrary, self-interested or biased motivation may be the spur to undertake
action that happens to be socially desirable from some external perspective.
Where this occurs, constitutional actors are led, as if by an invisible hand, to
promote social welfare as a byproduct of pursuing their own interests.
1. Presidential Self-Pardons
An example involves the debate over presidential self-pardons. To date,
this debate is strictly hypothetical; no President has ever issued a pardon for
himself. Yet the structure of the debate helps to illuminate the scope and limits
of nemo iudex. For critics of the possibility of presidential self-pardons,92 nemo
iudex is a deep principle of the constitutional structure, which should be read
into specific provisions where possible. The critics accordingly claim that the
facially unqualified language of Article II's Pardon Clause-"The President. . .
shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United
States, except in cases of impeachment"93 -should be read as containing an
implied prohibition against presidential self-pardons. On this view, the
Constitution's specific provisions evidence a general "structural distaste for
self-dealing" and "self-judging."94 The asserted examples of this structural
distaste include the constitutional prohibitions on legislators accepting offices
whose emoluments they have voted on," the Twenty-Seventh Amendment's
ban on salary raises without an intervening election,96 and a putative
prohibition on the Vice President's presiding over the Senate during his own
impeachment trial-although the last example is an entirely implicit
prohibition that rests on nothing more solid than the same "structural distaste"
92. For such a critique, see, e.g., Brian C. Kalt, Note, Pardon Me?: The Constitutional Case
Against Presidential Self-Pardons, io6 YALE L.J. 779 (1996).
93. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
94. Kalt, supra note 92, at 795.
95. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
96. Id. amend. XXVII.
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for self judging, the same assertion of nemo iudex that underlies the main
argument against presidential self-pardons.97
One of the main responses to this critique invokes the countervailing risk
that a structural prohibition on presidential self-pardons may rule out self-
pardons that would be desirable from a social point of view. On this view, the
Philadelphia Convention rejected Edmund Randolph's "view that
[presidential] self-dealing may be a problem" and instead opted for "a stronger
presidency with the risk of occasional abuse."" The problem with the
simplistic invocation of nemo iudex in this setting is that
even a presidential self-pardon may not be solely an act of self-dealing
. . . . Richard Nixon could have thereby spared Gerald Ford the odious
task of issuing a pardon for his predecessor. While self-dealing may be
a factor, the country may actually be a significant beneficiary of the self-
pardon concept.99
This is, in effect, an invisible hand possibility theorem applied to
presidential self-pardoning: the self-regarding incentives of presidents may
align with the public good. A structural constraint on presidential self-pardons,
on the other hand, might produce too few pardons, sacrificing social welfare on
the altar of impartiality.
In this example, the critique of presidential self-pardons illustrates a
methodological mistake about constitutional law. Some of the Constitution's
provisions may rest on the logic of nemo iudex, as in the examples given above
(although it is striking that these examples are mostly marginal or second-
decimal rules). With respect to the issue of legislative salaries, for example, the
main feature of the constitutional design is that legislators vote on their own
salaries, whereas the asserted examples of nemo iudex safeguards, involving
emoluments and the Twenty-Seventh Amendment's delay rule, just tweak the
rules around the edges. Even insofar as the examples are valid, however, they
cannot be generalized into a constitutional principle against, or a "structural
distaste" for, self-dealing or self-judging. In some contexts, constitutional
rulemakers follow nemo iudex. In others they do not, depending upon context-
97. For the debate over the question of whether the Vice President may preside at his own
impeachment, compare Michael Stokes Paulsen, Someone Should Have Told Spiro Agnew, 14
CONST. COMMENT. 245 (1997), arguing that he can, with Joel K. Goldstein, Can the Vice
President Preside at His Own Impeachment Trial? A Critique ofBare Textualism, 44 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 849 (2ooo), claiming that he cannot.
g8. Robert Nida & Rebecca L. Spiro, The President as His Own Judge and Jury: A Legal Analysis of
the Presidential Self-Pardon Power, 52 OKLA. L. REv. 197, 218 (1999).
99. Id. at 219 .
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specific judgments about the direction and magnitude of competing political
risks, and about relevant tradeoffs. Just as it is treacherous in the extreme to
generalize principles of "federalism" from the Constitution's many, highly
specific, and calibrated provisions for assigning powers and duties between
states and the union,oo so too any generalization of a structural nemo iudex
principle would deliberately have to overlook central features of the
constitutional design.
2. Presidential Pardons for Treason
At Philadelphia, the main thread of debate over the pardon power
addressed whether the power should cover the offense of treason. Randolph
moved that it should not, holding that "the prerogative of pardon in these cases
was too great a trust" either because "[t]he President himself may be guilty" -
the self-pardoning issue-or because "[t]he Traytors may be his own
instruments."' Madison noted that lodging the power to pardon treason in
the legislature would create problems of its own, but said that the power was
"peculiarly improper for the President,""o2 presumably because of Randolph's
concerns over direct self-dealing or indirect cronyism. The Convention,
however, voted down Randolph's motion and thereby included treason within
the scope of the President's pardon power.
Later commentators such as Hamilton and Justice Story justified that
decision by appealing to institutional energy and activity levels. The "principal
argument[]," in Hamilton's view, was that
[i]n seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical
moments when a well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels
may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth; and which, if
suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible afterwards to
recall. The dilatory process of convening the legislature, or one of its
branches, for the purpose of obtaining its sanction to the measure,
loo. John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122
HARv. L. REV. 2003, 2004 (2009) (arguing that "the specific means chosen to implement our
form of concurrent sovereignty in fact define the concept of federalism and that, contrary to
the Court's recent cases, there is no freestanding federalism").
101. 2 FARRAND,supra note 69, at 626.
102. Id. at 627.
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would frequently be the occasion of letting slip the golden opportunity.
The loss of a week, a day, an hour, may sometimes be fatal."o3
The implicit structure of this argument differs from the argument for
presidential self-pardons. In the latter case, presidential self-interest is itself the
spur that motivates a socially desirable level of activity, whereas here the
presidency is assumed, for exogenous reasons, to be more active and decisive
than the legislature. Yet the two arguments have a common feature: even if
presidential power to pardon for treason creates risks of direct self-dealing or
indirect cronyism, those risks are an unavoidable and acceptable byproduct of
the institutional allocation of pardoning power that produces optimal levels of
activity.
3. Legislative Qualifications
In some cases, the tradeoff between impartiality on the one hand and
energy or motivation on the other is closely tied to the issue of institutional
autonomy or independence. Justice Story's argument that each chamber of the
bicameral Congress should have the authority to judge the qualifications of its
members tied together independence and motivation by observing, in effect,
that only institutional self-interest would provide the necessary motivation for
institutional self-defense, and that institutional self-defense is necessary to the
maintenance of an ongoing system of independent institutions that check and
balance one another. In justice Story's words,
No other body, but itself, can have the same motives to preserve and
perpetuate these attributes; no other body can be so perpetually
watchful to guard its own rights and privileges from infringement, to
purify and vindicate its own character, and to preserve the rights, and
sustain the free choice of its constituents.o4
4. Legislation, Partiality, and the System of Checks and Balances
Similar reasoning implies that Madison's famous nemo iudex argument in
Federalist No. lo must be understood in conjunction with his argument for
checks and balances in Federalist No. 5i. In the former, Madison argued that
" [n]o man is allowed to be judge in his own cause, because his interest would
103. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, supra note 23, at 417 (Alexander Hamilton). Justice Story echoes
Hamilton. See 3 STORY, supra note 89, § 1494, at 351.
104. 2 STORY, supra note 89, § 831, at 295.
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certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With
equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and
parties at the same time . . . .""o Accordingly, Madison argued, legislative
majorities would make biased and partisan decisions.
Madison's solution was that the effects of legislative partiality should be
offset by structural devices of checks and balances. In the language of
Madison's Federalist No. 51, such devices would make "[a]mbition . . .
counteract ambition,"o' harnessing the motivational energy of partial, biased,
or self-interested officials to promote the power and independence of the
institutions in which those officials served. Federalist No. 51 thus offers an
invisible hand argument for competition among self-serving individuals and
institutions, an argument ultimately derived from the Scottish Enlightenment
theorists David Hume, Adam Ferguson, and Adam Smith, who influenced
Madison.o7 Read in tandem, the point of Federalist No. lo and Federalist No. 51
is that the cure for biased decisionmaking on the part of legislatures is not
legislative impartiality, but rather equally biased decisionmaking by competing
institutions. And the key argument for such a system of offsetting biases,
according to Federalist No. 51, is that only the motivational energy supplied by
"ambition" will suffice to protect institutions from mutual encroachment, thus
ensuring the ongoing maintenance of a system in which separated powers
check and balance one another.
Elsewhere, I have claimed that the Madisonian argument for checks and
balances fails.os It specifies no mechanism for ensuring that institutions will
pursue "their" interests, as opposed to the interests of the individuals or
political parties who happen to staff them at any given time,' 9 and equally fails
to guarantee that competition among institutions will produce impartial
lawmaking, liberty, efficiency, a stable system of interactions among
autonomous institutions, or any other social or political good. Whatever the
substantive merits of Madison's argument, however, its structure is
conceptually important. It illustrates that multiplying, rather than attempting
to reduce, violations of nemo iudex may be necessary to produce systemically
valuable institutional energy and motivation-here the spurs of ambition, self-
105. THE FEDERALIST No. io, supra note 23, at 47 (James Madison).
io6. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 23, at 290 (James Madison).
107. Roy Branson, James Madison and the Scottish Enlightenment, 40 J. HIST. IDEAS 235 (1979).
,os. ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTION 38-43 (2011).
iog. See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, n18 HARY. L. REV.
915, 927 (2005); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation ofParties, Not Powers, 119
HARv. L. REV. 2311, 2324 (2006).
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interest, and institutional interest, which Madison assumed would work in
harness to maintain the system of mutually checking institutions.
IV. THE CALCULUS OF POLITICAL RISKS: RULES OF THUMB
If nemo iudex is a misleading half-truth, what follows? At a minimum,
"[flacile invocation[]"" of nemo iudex should, one hopes, come to be widely
seen as an embarrassing slip - the intellectual equivalent of burping at a dinner
party. Chanting "nemo iudex" is never a sufficient argument; one must always
go on to consider whether impartial decisionmaking is feasible and desirable in
the relevant domain. Nemo iudex problems may afflict all possible
arrangements, so that some fox or other must necessarily be placed in charge of
some henhouse or other, and extrinsic considerations will have to be called into
service to determine institutional arrangements. Alternatively, impartial
decisionmaking may be overbalanced by other competing considerations, such
as the direct costs of appointing an impartial decisionmaker, expertise,
institutional independence, and institutional energy.
Clearing the intellectual ground in this way is at least a step forward. The
constructive claim, however, is more difficult. In general, the theory of public
law should attempt to make progress toward specifying the conditions under
which rule designers should entrust officials or institutions with authority to
act as judges in their own cause. The difficulty is that, although the competing
political risks and the main tradeoffs can be stated in the abstract, it is not
possible to say in the abstract how the balance should be struck. In particular
contexts, with respect to different institutional problems, the calculus of
political risks will come out differently; the questions are inherently local and
are afflicted by severe empirical uncertainty. Nonetheless, it may be possible to
suggest some pragmatic rules of thumb for coping with the tradeoffs and
identifying, in a rough-and-ready way, conditions under which nemo iudex
should be either discarded or honored, and how, if at all, it should be
implemented. I will discuss three such rules of thumb: marginalism, optimizing,
and the availability of substitute protections against self-dealing by officials or
institutions.
A. Marginalism
Rule designers will rarely face an all-out choice between impartiality, as
such, and some competing value, as such. Rather they will have to adopt rules
416
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and institutions in a political context in which some other rules and institutions
are already settled. This is true even at constitutional conventions. Framers do
not usually consider all institutions as up for grabs all at once, but instead
accept some extant institutions for political reasons, and also consider
institutional choices piecemeal, reaching agreement on some issues -for
example, the composition of the legislature-before considering, for example,
the powers of the courts.
Moreover, the extant institutions will often build in some protections
against official self-dealing or biased decisionmaking. Where that is so, the
problem facing rule designers is marginalist: the question is not whether
impartiality as such is desirable; instead, the question is whether, given some
extant set of institutional checks or precautions against official self-dealing, it is
desirable to add further precautions. If each additional precaution produces
diminishing marginal benefits and increasing costs to the other values
discussed in Part III, precautions should be added just up to the point at which
the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost. Needless to say, in the rough
and tumble of rule design for real polities, the location of that point will usually
be unclear, and rule designers will have to proceed by informed guesswork.
The Philadelphia debate over congressional salaries turned in part upon
this theme. Given the structure of the new federal legislature, a decisive
fraction of the participants believed that political checks would sufficiently
deter self-dealing by federal legislators empowered to set their own salaries.
Indeed, as we have seen, Sherman worried that the federal legislators would be
subject to so much public pressure that they would set their salaries too low,
rather than too high"' -bending over backwards to demonstrate their lack of
self-interest. In modern terms, given the robust political checks already in
place, the Convention seems to have believed that extra precautions would
have slight marginal benefits, and indeed might even have net costs. Whether
or not that assessment was correct, the structure of the analysis illustrates that
a marginalist approach can cut daunting problems down to size and make
design choices more tractable, even under conditions of grave uncertainty.
B. Optimizing
As a corollary of the marginalist approach, rule designers will ordinarily do
best by optimizing across all relevant values in a given domain, rather than by
maximizing any one of them. Where impartiality trades off against
information, institutional autonomy, or institutional activity, it will rarely be
the best strategy simply to choose one value wholesale and pursue it to the
417
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maximum possible extent, giving no weight to the competing values. Rather,
on the assumption that pursuit of any one value has diminishing marginal
benefits (or conversely that violation of any one value produces increasing
marginal costs as the violation becomes increasingly severe"'), it will usually be
best to have some of each, rather than all of one and none of the other(s). This
is not a conceptual claim, but a seat-of-the-pants empirical judgment about the
shape of the marginal cost and benefit curves that institutional designers
usually face.
Many of the institutions of the U.S. constitutional order are structured as
optimizing compromises of this kind. We have seen, for example, that the
structure of congressional authority over salaries pursues the "some of both"
strategy. The core feature that legislators set their own salaries tends to
promote institutional autonomy, but rules like the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment and the Emoluments Clause temper that feature with collateral
protections for impartiality. Such outcomes partly reflect conscious strategies
of constitutional design, yet also result from the unpredictable interplay of
political forces combined with a large dose of path dependence. The main point
is not historical, but prescriptive: in many settings, modern constitutional
designers could do far worse than to aim for roughly optimizing compromises
of this sort.
C. Substitute Protections
In the example of congressional salaries, political checks against self-
dealing already provided substitute protections. In other examples, however,
rule designers can promote values that trade off against nemo iudex while
simultaneously adjusting some other margin of institutional design to
safeguard against the risks of self-dealing. Where there is a choice of alternative
means by which to promote impartiality or suppress self-dealing, the nemo
iudex approach -barring the decisionmaker from making decisions in which he
has an interest -need not be the best solution, all things considered. As Landis
argued in defense of the combination of functions in agencies, "[T]he fact that
there is this fusion of prosecution and adjudication in a single administrative
agency does not imply the absence of all checks. It implies simply the absence
of the traditional check.""'
Putting aside Landis's analysis of substitute protections in the
administrative state as a subject worthy of separate treatment, I will illustrate
112. See Yair Listokin, Taxation and Marriage: A Reappraisal (Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law Working
Paper No. 247, 2012), http://ssrn.con/abstract= 2070171.
113. LANDIS, supra note 43, at 98.
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the theme of substitute protections with two examples from the original
Constitution. In the debate at the Philadelphia Convention over presidential
pardons for treason, Wilson dismissed concerns about presidential self-dealing
by arguing that "[p]ardon is necessary for cases of treason, and is best placed in
the hands of the Executive. If he be himself a party to the guilt he can be impeached
and prosecuted."" Tracking this argument in part, the Convention specifically
excluded cases of impeachment from the scope of the pardon power."' In
modern terms, the expected harm of presidential self-dealing through abuse of
the pardon power is a function both of the risk that self-dealing will occur and
of the magnitude of the harm if it does occur. Wilson's argument points out
that the magnitude of the harm is limited; while the President might use the
pardon power to immunize himself from criminal punishment, no amount of
self-pardoning will keep him in office if a sufficient majority desires to remove
him.
Another illustration involves the authority of the houses of Congress to
"judge" the qualifications of their members and to expel members. As we have
seen, Justice Story's argument for entrusting that authority to the respective
chambers was that placing the authority anywhere else would create an
unacceptable threat to institutional autonomy. The Philadelphia Convention,
however, was concerned about the risk that cameral authority over
qualifications would be abused by majority legislative factions in order to expel
or otherwise oppress members of minority legislative factions -the same type
of group self-dealing by legislative majorities that Madison classed as a
violation of nemo iudex in Federalist No. lo. At the Convention, "Mr. Madison
observed that the right of expulsion .. . was too important to be exercised by a
bare majority of a quorum: and in emergencies of faction might be dangerously
abused. He moved that [expulsion would require a two-thirds vote of the
chamber].""i Morris objected that a supermajority requirement "may produce
abuses on the side of the minority. A few men from factious motives may keep
in a member who ought to be expelled.""' But the Convention unanimously
approved Madison's amendment with one state divided."'
In both of these examples, the risk of self-dealing was addressed not by
shifting decisionmaking authority to another official or institution, but by
adjusting a different margin of institutional design-either the availability of
114. 2 FARRAND, supra note 69, at 626 (emphasis added).
11s. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
n6. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 431
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impeachment for corrupt presidential pardons (an adjustment to the sanction
for a biased decision) or the voting rule for legislative expulsions (an
adjustment to the threshold necessary for a biased decision). The point
generalizes. Nemo iudex arguments often assume, implicitly, that identifying a
problem (the risk of self-dealing) necessarily implies a particular solution
(transferring decisionmaking authority away from the biased decisionmaker).
But in some institutional settings, other types of precautions or remedies are
also available, and the assumption no longer holds.
Where other precautions or remedies are indeed available, the rule designer
faces a choice and should adopt the solution that produces the greatest net
benefits, not necessarily the solution that strictly minimizes the risk of self-
dealing. As compared to a regime in which another institution decides on
expulsion, Madison's supermajority solution may not be the one that strictly
minimizes the risk of factional self-dealing in the legislative chamber. Given
the benefits of institutional autonomy identified by Justice Story, however, the
combination of cameral expulsion authority and a supermajority voting rule
has a plausible claim to represent an optimal set of precautions -or at least a
better set of precautions than any feasible competitor.
CONCLUSION
Billed as one of the law's great maxims, nemo iudex is in fact a shifty half-
truth, useful at some times and in some settings, useless or positively
misleading in others. Perhaps many grand legal principles have this
characteristic when closely inspected. But it requires no such inspection to see
that nemo iudex is contradicted by central structural features of our
constitutional order. In our constitutional system, legislators shape their own
elections and determine their own compensation, judges decide cases about
their own salaries, and administrators rule on the validity of cases they
themselves have brought under rules that they have written. In a system like
that, the real puzzle is how nemo iudex maintains its grip on the legal mind. A
well-rounded analysis should see the impartiality of decisionmakers as one
institutional good among others, to be pursued, or not, as a larger calculus of
institutional optimization suggests.
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